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CASE NOTES
issue, noted the decision of the New York court in Winston v. Saugerties
Farms, Inc.,80 holding that a statute prohibiting a corporation from issuing
stock except for "value," does not strictly require payment from the person to
whom the stock is issued, but merely requires that the corporation receive
full value for all stock issued. However, in the light of the history of un-
compromising interpretation of the Massachusetts statute," whether the
cited decision will be decisive of the question is far from a certainty. This
doubt is further buttressed by decisions in Massachusetts which have con-
strued jointly32 section fifteen" with section seventeen," which provides
that "no corporation shall issue a share for a less amount to be paid in
thereon than the par value of the shares at the date of issue." (Emphasis
supplied.)
It would appear that adoption by the court of the "New York" view
would have much to recommend it, since a contrary view amounts more to
a windfall than to a legitimate protection of the creditor. Since protection
of corporate creditors and not the punishment of directors is the end to
be sought," the manifest injustice to the directors under a strict interpre-
tation of the statute in the hypothetical situation, should be enough to
convince the court of the impropriety of a further extension of this theory 3a
PETER J. NORTON
Creditors' Rights—Federal Income Tax Lien----Cash Surrender Value
of Life Insurance Policy—Equitable Doctrine of Marshaling Inap-
plicable.—Meyer 11. United States. 1—The petitioner's husband was the
owner of four life insurance policies, of which she was the revocable bene-
ficiary, having a total face value of $50,000. In 1943, the husband pledged the
policies to a bank as collateral security for a loan. The bank was given the
right to satisfy its claim from the net proceeds of the policies, i.e., the amount
which would be paid by the insurers upon the husband's death. Subsequently,
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed deficiencies against the hus-
30 Supra note 7.
m Supra note 2.
32 Boucher v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 259 Mass. 259, 156 N.E. 424 (1927); Mitchell
v. Mitchell Woodbury Co., 263 Mass. 160, 160 N.E. 539 (1928).
33 Supra note 2.
34 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 155, 	 17 (1932).
35 Frank Kumin Co. v. Marean, 283 Mass. 332, 186 N.E. 780 (1933).
36 Analogously, even under the provisions of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act, Mass. Gen. Law ch. 109A, §* 1-13 (1932), which allow a creditor to set aside a
fraudulent conveyance which is detrimental to his rights, recovery is limited to that
property, the conveyance of which tended to result in a fraud on the creditor. If re-
covery is limited to such a "cause-effect" relation under a statute dealing with a per-
son guilty of "fraudulent" conduct, a fortiori, should not such a limit be imposed in
the hypothetical situation? This is not to construe the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act and the applicable sections of Mass. Gen. Law ch. 156 in pan materia, but
merely to compare the theories of recovery in so far as the underlying policy of
both is the protection of creditors. See also, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law 720.
1 375 U.S. 233 (1963).
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band for income taxes due for 1946 and 1947. A notice of lien was filed in
July 1955. Later that same year, the husband died. At the time of his death,
the cash surrender value of the policies was $27,285.87 and the amount of the
bank's claim was $26,844.66. The insurers paid the latter amount to the bank
and distributed the balance to the petitioner (some $24,000). In an action
commenced by the United States against the petitioner, individually as well as
executrix of her husband's estate, the United States District Court, by ap-
plying the equitable doctrince of marshaling, held that the Government could
satisfy its lien, to its full extent, from the insurance proceeds in the petitioner's
hands. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed per
curiam. The United States Supreme Court, with three justices dissenting,
HELD• Reversed. Because of the state policy protecting life insurance bene-
ficiaries from creditors of the insured, marshaling is not properly applicable
and, therefore, the Government can satisfy its lien only to the extent of the
excess of the cash surrender value over the amount of the bank's claim, i.e.,
$441.21 ($27,285.87 — 26,844.66).2
In addition to the issue of the applicability of the doctrine of marshal-
ing, Meyer presents three topics for consideration. These may be stated as:
(1) To what part of the sum payable by the insurer upon the insured's
death did the lien attach? (2) What effect did the insured's death have
upon the lien? (3) What is the effect upon the lien of a state statute protect-
ing insurance beneficiaries from creditors of the insured?
To what part of the sum payable by the insurer upon the insured's
death did the lien attach? Section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 provides that:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the
same after demand, the amount . . . shall be a lien in favor of the
United States upon all property and rights to property, whether
real or personal, belonging to such person. (Emphasis supplied.) 3
Several court decisions have made it clear that the insured does not have
"property" or "rights to property" in the entire amount payable by the
insurer upon the insured's death. In Rowen v. Commissioner,* the court
stated: " [1] he entire proceeds were never an asset belonging to the decedent
. . ." (Emphasis in original.) The United States Supreme Court, in an im-
portant 1958 decision, 2 observed that the taxpayer could never have reached
or enjoyed the entire proceeds of his life insurance policy. Based on this
observation, the Court held: "We therefore do not believe that . . . [the
taxpayer] had 'property' or 'rights to property' in the proceeds, within the
meaning of § 3670 [of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939], to which the
federal tax lien might attach."
It is equally clear that the insured does have a property interest in the
2 See also Wintner •v. United States, 312 F.2d 749 (6th Cir.. 1963), reversed per
curiam, 375 U.S. 393 (1964), Wintner involves the same issues as presented in Meyer.
3 Section 3670 of the 1939 Code contained the same provision. Int. Rev. Code of
1939, 	 3670,-53 Stat. 448.
4 215 F.2d 641, 647 (2d Cir. 1954).
5 United States v. Bess, 357.7.5.'51 (1958).
o Id. at 56.
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cash surrender value of the policy sufficient to support the lien. The nature of
this element of a life insurance contract was examined by Judge Addison
Brown in the case of In re McKinney.? His statement, twice quoted by the
Supreme Court"; follows:
[T]he surrender value of the policy arises from the fact that the
fixed annual premium is much in excess of the annual risk during
the earlier years of the policy, an excess made necessary in order to
balance the deficiency of the same premium to meet the annual
risk during the latter years of the policy. This excess in the premium
paid over the annual cost of insurance, with accumulations of inter-
est, constitutes the surrender value. Though this excess of premiums
paid is legally the sole property of the company, still in practical
effect, though not in law, it is moneys of the assured deposited with
the company in advance to make up the deficiency in later premiums
to cover the annual cost of insurance, instead of being retained by
the assured and paid by him to the company in the shape of greatly
increased premiums, when the risk is greatest . . . . So long as the
policy remains in force the company has not practically any benefi-
cial interest in it, except as its custodian, with the obligation to
maintain it unimpaired and suitably invested for the benefit of
the insured .°
The thrust of this language is that the cash surrender value is a fund held
by the insurer for the account of the insured. It has been decided many times
that the federal tax lien does attach to this fund. The Supreme Court, in
United States v. Bess," held: "It is therefore clear that . . . [the taxpayer]
had 'property' or 'rights to property' within the meaning of § 3670, in the
cash surrender value." In United States v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 11 the
court noted: " [I] t has been squarely held that, where the provisions of the
taxing statute are followed, a tax lien is perfected upon the cash surrender
value of a policy of insurance issued to taxpayer upon his life.m 2
What effect did the insured's death have upon the lien? It is often con-
tended that the cash surrender value becomes non-existent when the insured
dies. The contention is based on the reasoning that the life insurance con-
tract involves two promises of the insurer; one to pay the cash surrender
value while the insured lives and another to distribute the face value of the
policy to those entitled to it upon the death of the insured. The two promises
are said to be not only separate, but mutually exclusive as well.
7 15 Fed. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1883).
8 Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 469 (1913); Hiscock v. Mertens, 205 U.S.
202, 211 (1907).
8 In re McKinney, supra note 7, at $37.
19 Supra note 5, at 56.
11 256 F.2d 17, 22 (4th Ur. 1958).
12 The statement is followed by citations to seven cases. See also United States
v. Wilson, 195 F. Supp. 332, 335 (D.N.J. 1961), "Thus it appears that taxpayer had
a property right in the cash surrender value to which the plaintiff's lien attached. . . ."
and United States v. Hopkins, 193 F. Supp. 207, 209-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), "As to the life
insurance policy . . . I conclude that the Government has an enforceable lien on the
cash surrender value of that policy."
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Judge Learned Hand addressed himself to this argument in United
States v. Behrens." After examining the nature of the life insurance con-
tract and the legal relations of the parties to it, he stated: "It follows from
what we have said that there is no logical escape from holding that the
`surrender value' comes to an end on the insured's death, if we dispose of
the controversy in accordance with the ordinary rules governing con-
tracts."' 4 However, after noting that many courts had spoken of the cash
surrender value as a fund, he held that if that were so, "the lien would
follow it into the 'proceeds.' " He concluded by saying:
Regardless of what . . . [we] might have held, had the question
come up as res nova, we think that this interpretation is imperative,
and therefore we all agree that the "proceeds" were subject to the
lien.' 5
Judge Hand cited a prior decision of his court, Rowen v. Commissioner,"
wherein it was held: "[T]he proceeds to the extent of the cash surrender
values which were included therein were property once belonging to the
decedent in his lifetime.m7
 The holding is based on a theory that though
the cash surrender value became merged into the face value when the
insured died, it did not lose its separate identity for purposes of determin-
ing property owned by the decedent. The theory was stated by the Supreme
Court in Bess. "Thus in economic reality the insurer pays the beneficiary
the insured's 'fund,' plus another amount sufficient to perform the insurer's
promise to pay the proceeds on the insured's death." 18
Thus, it has been held that the cash surrender value is not extinguished
upon the insured's death, but rather it is a part of the proceeds distributed
to the beneficiaries by the insurer. The tax lien, which attached to the cash
surrender value, merely follows it into the hands of the recipients. The effect
is attachment of the lien to so much of the proceeds as once was the
surrender value.
What is the effect upon the lien of a state statute protecting insurance
beneficiaries from creditors of the insured? In its Bess decision, the Court
held: "[O]nce it has been determined that state law creates sufficient
interests in the insured to satisfy the requirements of § 3670, state law is
inoperative to prevent the attachment of liens created by federal statutes in
favor of the United States." 15 In Commissioner v. Stern, 20 decided the
same day as Bess, the Court, in discussing the effect of a state exemption
statute when no lien had been created, stated: "We agree that state law may
not destroy a tax lien which has attached in the insured's lifetime." In
Leuschner v. First Western Bank & Trust Co.,2' a case involving a
13 230 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1956).
1 4 Id. at 506-07.
15 Id. at 507.
10 215 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1954).
17 Id. at 647.
18 United States v. Bess, supra note 5, at 59.
19 Id. at 56-57.
20 357 U.S. 39, 47 (1958).
21 261 F.2d 705 (9th Cit. 1958).
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California statute protecting the beneficiaries of spendthrift trusts and its
efficacy against the claim of the United States for income taxes, the court
held: "There is no doubt that the paramount right to collect taxes of the
federal government overrides a state statute providing for exemptions."22
Distinguished from the above discussion, is the situation where the
Government is not basing its claim on an unsatisfied lien, but rather is
proceeding under Section 6901 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
This section, in part, provides for the liability, pro tanto, of transferees
of property of delinquent taxpayers. The Stern case23 involved this type of
proceeding. The Court held that, in the absence of a lien, a claim for taxes
could be asserted against the beneficiary "only to the extent that state law
imposes such liability in favor of other creditors of the insured." 24 Thus, in
Bess, where the Commissioner had obtained the lien during the insured's
lifetime, the state statute could not operate to prevent satisfaction of the
lien from proceeds in the bands of the beneficiary, whereas in Stern, where
no lien had been acquired, the statute shielded completely the beneficiary
from the Government. There is thus a premium on the Commissioner for
"winning a race with the archangel of death."25 Transferee liability was
also the subject of the decision in Bowen v. Commissioner.2° It was there
held that since the insurance beneficiaries had no liability to the insured's
creditors under New York law, they likewise were not liable as transferees
to the United States for his unpaid income taxes.
In light of the above discussion, it may be assumed that the Government
was confident when it presented its argument before the Supreme Court in
Meyer v. United States.27 The tax lien of a little more than $6,000 had
attached to the cash surrender value of more than $27,000. True, New
York has a statute protecting beneficiaries of life insurance policies," but
the Supreme Court in Bess and Stern had specifically stated that this type
of state exemption statute was incapable of destroying the lien once it
attached. Finally, the fact that the policies had been pledged to a bank as
collateral for a loan probably gave the Government no cause for concern.
Since the bank could satisfy its lien out of the entire proceeds and the United
States could satisfy its lien only from that portion of the proceeds which
had constituted the "cash surrender value," the situation was ripe for
the application of the equitable doctrine of marshaling. Judge Learned
22 Id. at 708.
23 Commissioner v. Stern, supra note 20.
24 The quotation is taken from United States v. Bess, supra note 5, at 53, wherein
Stern was distinguished.
23 Grayck, The Liability of a Life Insurance Beneficiary for the Insured's Income
Taxes, 14 Tax L. Rev. 137, 148 (1958).
26 Supra note 16.
27 Supra note 1.
28 N.Y. Ins. Law, § 166. Section 1 provides in part:
If any policy of insurance has been or shall be effected by any person on his
own life in favor of a third person beneficiary, ... such third person beneficiary
. . . shall be entitled to the proceeds and avails of such policy as against the
creditors, personal representatives, trustees in bankruptcy and receivers in
state and federal courts of the person effecting the insurance.
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Hand, when presented in United States v. Beltrens 2° with a similar state
of facts also involving a New York beneficiary, applied the doctrine with
these words:
[T]he "proceeds" were large enough to pay both claims, and it is
well settled law that, when one creditor has a claim against two
funds as security and another creditor has a claim against only
one of them, the loan of the first will be marshalled against that
fund which is security for his loan only. 8°
Therefore, by application of the doctrine in the instant case, the bank's
claim would be marshaled against the portion of the proceeds which were
security for its claim only, i.e., the entire proceeds less the "cash surrender
value" part of them. The United States would then be free to satisfy its
lien from that "fund." Thus, such confidence as may have existed on the
part of the Government counsel litigating Meyer was certainly justifiable.
The Supreme Court, however, refused to apply the doctrine of
marshaling. It noted that the doctrine was "founded . . . in equity, being
designed to promote fair dealing and justice." 31 The Court determined that
the New York exemption statute reflected the state's "beneficent policy" 32
of protection to the widow from creditors of her deceased husband 33 and
that to apply marshaling would be an inequitable overturning of that
policy. The Court cited several cases wherein the doctrine was refused
because one of the funds was exempt under state law. However, none of these
cases involved federal liens created by federal statute.
The equitable nature of the doctrine was well stated in Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co. v. Kip,34 a case involving the settlement of an estate.
Broadly defined, it is a rule which courts of equity sometimes
invoke to compel a creditor who has the right to make his debt
out of either of two funds to resort to that one of them which will
not interfere with or defeat the rights of another creditor who
has recourse to only one of these funds. It is not a vested right
or lien founded on contract, but rests upon equitable principles
called into action by the benevolence of the court. 35
The court in In re Snell's Estate" quoted a legal encyclopaedias/ as
follows:
29 Supra note 13.
So Id. at 507.
81 Meyer v. United States, supra note 1, at 237.
82 Professor Cooley has stated well the policy considerations behind this type
of exemption statute.
All statutes bearing on the exemption of life policies or their proceeds seem
based on the theory that, in the absence of an expressed contrary intent, the
object of the ordinary life insurance policy should be considered as the pro-
tection of the insured's family after his death, and this object and desire is
laudable and in accordance with public policy.
Cooley, Briefs on Insurance 6508 (2d ed. 1928).
93 In fact, the statute protects all third party beneficiaries. See note 28, supra.
34 192 N.Y. 266, 85 N.E. 59 (1908).
55 Id. at 283, 85 N.B. at 64.
36 227 Wis. 455, 279 N.W. 24 (1938).
37 19 American and English Encyclopaedia 1284 (2d ed. 1901).
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The doctrine of marshalling [assets] being a rule of equity and
having its foundation in principles Of natural justice, its appli-
cation will not be inforced when it would so operate as to work
substantial injustice or injury to any party in interest. Thus mar-
shalling will not be applied to the detriment of a third person
having an equity equal or superior to that of the person seeking
to invoke the rule."
A New York court once wrote: "But where equities are lacking the
doctrine of marshalling has been rejected.""
The general rule that marshaling is a matter of the court's equitable
discretion is most of ten applied in cases wherein a party with equal or
superior equity would be adversely affected by invocation of the doctrine."
The widow in Meyer would have been so affected, but it is questionable
whether her standing in equity is equal or superior to that of the United
States. As Mr. Justice White pointed out in his dissenting opinion, "It
is not unreasonable to suppose that the beneficiary enjoyed the benefits of
the bank loan which is here used to insulate the cash surrender value from
the government lien.'" Also, it is not unreasonable to suppose that she
benefited from her husband's failure to pay his income taxes properly.
Another objection raised by Mr. Justice White relates to whether the
Court accurately stated New York's public policy. He reasoned that the
policy should be interpreted as protection of the beneficiary from all creditors
other than those who obtain a security interest in the proceeds during
the lifetime of the insured. Thus, the state's public policy would not have
been relevant in the Meyer fact situation. It is interesting to note that the
effect of the New York statute upon United States taxes had been twice
considered by federal courts. In United States v. Goddard,42 the court held:
"Section 166 of the New York Insurance Law . . . is ineffective to exempt
the proceeds of . . . [the policy] from the claim of the United States
for unpaid income tax and victory tax . . . [owed by the insured]."43
In Fried v. New York Life Ins. Co.,44 the court stated: "The New York
Court of Appeals agrees that New York may not interfere with the power
of Congress to levy, and then collect, federal taxes on income." 45 The Court's
use of the statute in Meyer has thus given it a potency it never before pos-
88 In re Snell's Estate, supra note 36, at 467, 279 N.W. at 29-30.
88 In re Berwind's Estate, 181 Misc. 559, 564, 42 N Y S 2d 58, 64 (Surr. Ct. 1943).
45 Illustrative is United States v. Bleser, 34 F. Supp. 653 (D. Wis. 1940). There
the pledgee bank held both life insurance policies and corporate securities. Three years
after the pledge, the United States filed a tax lien. Subsequent to the insured's death,
when the Government claimed it was entitled to marshaling, the bank contended that
it should be permitted to satisfy its claim from the readily-available insurance proceeds
rather than be compelled to seek satisfaction from the hard to market securities. The
court quoted In re Snell's Estate, supra note 36, and held: "The case at bar is not one
where the court should attempt to marshal the assets." United States v. Bleser, supra
at 655.
41 Meyer v. United States, supra note 1, at 246.
42 111 F. Supp. 607 (W.D.N.Y. 1952).
48 Id. at 608.
44 241 F.2d 504 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 922 (1957).
46 Id. at 506.
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sessed. It can now do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., interfere with,
and even defeat entirely, a federal lien.
Mr. Justice White began the conclusion of his dissent by writing:
"Finally, the federal revenue deserves more protection than it receives
today!"40 He viewed the majority's decision as an invitation for more
taxpayers to invest in life insurance policies and to obtain bank loans by
pledging them. The harm of such an invitation is, however, not so real
as it may appear. It is to the advantage of the vast majority of married
taxpayers to file joint tax returns. As a result of this practice, generally
both the husband and the wife are individually liable for the full amount of
any tax deficiency.
The majority opinion must be read as holding that the New York
statute makes marshaling inequitable as to all those under its protection.
As pointed out above, 47 New York extends its statutory shield to all third
party beneficiaries regardless of their relationship to the insured. The
Commissioner would receive comfort if Meyer could be viewed as illustrative
that widows, as well as sureties, are the "darlings of the court." However,
this solace is not available to him.
CHARLES BRADFORD ABBOTT
Federal Jurisdiction---"Federal Common Law" vs. State Law.—United
States v. Sovimerville. 1—The Farmers Home Administration (FHA), an
agency of the Department of Agriculture, made loans2 over a four year
period to Flickinger, which were secured in part by certain livestock. A
security agreement, which stated that it was "intended by the parties to
serve as both 'Financing Statement' and 'Security Agreement' under Penn-
sylvania law," was executed and the security interest perfected in accord-
ance with the laws of that state .2 Nine months after the security agreement
was duly filed as a financing statement, Flickinger delivered three of his
cows to the defendant for sale at the latter's auction. The plaintiff did not
know of this delivery or consent to it, and the defendant-auctioneer did not
have actual knowledge* of the Government's security interest in the live-
stock. The three cows were sold at the defendant's auction, and the purchase
money, less commissions, was turned over to Flickinger. Upon learning of
this sale, FHA urged Flickinger to liquidate all of his assets, which he did.
The proceeds were then applied to the balance of the loans leaving a debt
slightly in excess of five-hundred dollars. Plaintiff, on behalf of FHA,
96 Meyer v. United States, supra note 1, at 246.
47 See note 33, supra.
1 324 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1963).
2 The loans were made in compliance with the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant
Act, 60 Stat. 1071, et seq. (1946), 7 U.S.C. 1007, et seq. (1958), now 75 Stat. 310,
et seq. (1961), 7 U.S.C. 1941, et seq. (1963).
3 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A 9-101 et seq. (Uniform Commercial Code).
4 An auctioneer is the agent of the owner of the property to be sold, and is guilty
of conversion if the principal has no title to the property, even though the agent
acts without knowledge of the title defect. Restatement (Second), Agency § 349 (1959).
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